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The central question of this study involves the relation between the use of takeover defenses and 
IPO firm value. We report that management frequently uses takeover defenses before taking the 
firm public. The use of takeover defenses is primarily motivated by managerial entrenchment. 
IPO investors anticipate potential conflict of interests with management and reduce the price 
they pay for the IPO shares if takeover defenses are adopted. Although managers internalize this 
cost of takeover defenses to the degree they own pre-IPO stock, they are likely to gain through 
private control benefits. Non-management pre-IPO owners lose. Their shares are worth less, but 
different from managers, they do not get offsetting private control benefits. We infer that 
managers use takeover defenses to protect private control benefits at non-management pre-IPO 
owners expense. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, takeover defenses have been at the center of a major European public policy 
debate. The long-awaited European takeover code, often referred to as the Thirteenth Directive, 
was, although agreed upon by the Council of Ministers, rejected by European Parliament on July 
4, 20011. The ongoing argument relates to the ‘strict neutrality’ rule that prevents managers from 
using most takeover defenses without shareholder approval (Kirchner and Painter, 2001). 
Proponents of the strict neutrality rule argue that takeovers improve social welfare by 
transferring assets to those who value them most, whereas opponents argue that hostile takeover 
activity may lead to an unnecessary and socially harmful loss of jobs. Especially the newly 
adopted takeover law of Germany adds to the controversy. German takeover law allows 
managers to implement defensive measures even if no takeover is pending.  
This paper contributes to the policy debate by providing an example of the effect of 
takeover defenses on firm valuation. In particular, we examine the costs and benefits of takeover 
defenses at the time of an initial public offering (IPO) on Euronext Amsterdam. There are 
distinct advantages to structure the analysis around a corporate event – the IPO. First, the IPO 
firm’s management adopts takeover defenses, as part of a long-term strategy, not because a 
takeover is imminent. Second, IPO firm’s managers often internalize a large proportion of the 
costs of takeover defenses through their substantial pre-IPO stock ownership. The situation is 
different for large public corporations, because managers at these companies typically own only 
a small fraction of the firm’s equity.  
The presence of one or more takeover defenses at the IPO affects three parties: 
management, IPO investors and non-management pre-IPO owners. If protected by a takeover 
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defense, the IPO firm’s management may block wealth-creating takeovers, indulge in private 
benefits and entrench itself at shareholders’ expense. Principal-agent theory predicts that pre-
IPO owners, including managers, bear these costs when the firm goes public (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Investors, that buy shares in the IPO, anticipate conflict of interests with 
management and are expected to negatively factor takeover defenses into the price they are 
willing to pay for the IPO shares. Management (also an important, often controlling owner) 
recognizes that the IPO valuation will be negatively affected by the extent to which they use 
takeover defenses. In theory, management would therefore decide to use takeover defenses only 
when the retention of private benefits outweighs the reduction in share prices due to the adoption 
of these defensive measures (Bebchuk, 1999). Non-management pre-IPO owners stand to lose. 
Their shares are expected to be worth less because of the takeover defenses but, different from 
managers, they do not obtain compensating private benefits.  
Our research extends a growing empirical literature examining the use of takeover 
defenses by U.S. IPO firms. Field and Karpoff (2002) report that 53 percent of the firms going 
public in the United States deploy at least one takeover defense. They find that the presence of 
takeover defenses is negatively related to the probability of acquisition within the next five 
years. Takeover premiums, on the other hand, are not significantly related to the use of takeover 
defenses. This suggests that managers do not use takeover defenses to bargain for higher 
takeover premiums that would benefit all shareholders. Instead they seem to adopt takeover 
defenses to insulate themselves from the market for corporate control. Field and Karpoff (2002) 
and Field (1999) conclude that IPO managers are most likely to use takeover defenses when their 
private control benefits are large. Daines and Klausner (2001) document that nearly two-thirds of 
the 310 American firms that went public between January 1994 and July 1997 have adopted 
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takeover defenses. They study the factors that influence the rate of adoption of defensive 
measures. Consistent with Field and Karpoff (2002), they find no support for the premise that 
takeover defenses are adopted to negotiate higher takeover premiums in future takeovers. 
Additionally, Daines and Klausner (2001) report that IPO firms do not use takeover defenses to 
shield firm-specific investment in human capital or to encourage managers to invest in valuable 
long-term investment projects. They conclude that the use of takeover defenses at the IPO is best 
explained by managerial entrenchment. Coates (2000) argues that the use of takeover defenses at 
IPO firms is puzzling. Why would that many IPO firms adopt takeover defenses, when, in 
theory, these defensive measures reduce firm value? 
The extant literature thus suggests that takeover defenses yield no benefits to IPO 
investors or to non-management pre-IPO shareholders, but given their widespread adoption, 
apparently do provide some private benefits to managers. The direct valuation impact of 
takeover defenses at the time of the IPO, however, remains largely unexplored. Our study aims 
to fill this gap. Although private control benefits are difficult to measure empirically, these 
benefits should be reflected in a reduction in the price that IPO investors are willing to pay for 
the shares.  
We analyze a sample of 111 IPOs on Euronext Amsterdam during the years 1984-1999. 
On average, IPO firms in the Netherlands adopt two takeover defenses before going public. The 
use of takeover defenses is common. More than 90 percent of IPO firms adopt at least one 
takeover defense. We report that IPO firms in the Netherlands deploy takeover defenses at the 
same rate as other publicly traded firms. First, we analyze in which circumstances these 
defensive measures are adopted. Similar to previous U.S. studies, we are unable to identify 
factors that can consistently explain the use of takeover defenses by IPO firms. Second, we 
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examine whether takeover defenses impact IPO firm value, as predicted by standard principal-
agent theory. Controlling for differences in size, profitability, sales growth and management 
ownership, we report that takeover defenses are inversely related to IPO firm value. In particular, 
the use of non-voting share certificates is negatively related to IPO firm value.  
Our results suggest that managers use takeover defenses to protect their private benefits 
of control. Managers are important, often controlling owners. For example, management pre-IPO 
stock ownership exceeds 50 percent in 51 IPO firms (46 percent of total sample size). In general, 
managers therefore decide which and to which extent takeover defenses are adopted preceding 
the IPO. As these defensive measures lower firm value, managers incur costs through their stock 
ownership, but gain through their private benefits. IPO investors are likely to break even. 
Consistent with agency theory, they factor takeover defenses negatively into the price they are 
paying for the IPO shares. Non-management pre-IPO owners suffer losses. Their shares are 
worth less and, unlike managers, they do not get offsetting private benefits2.   
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 provides a 
detailed overview of takeover defenses in the Netherlands. Section 4 presents the data. In this 
section we compare the use of takeover defenses in IPO firms to that in other public companies. 
Section 5 explains the methodology. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Prior literature 
 
Bebchuk (1999) develops a theoretical model to analyze management’s decision to adopt 
takeover defenses when taking the firm public. His model predicts that this decision depends on 
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the expected size of the private benefits of control, such as above-market levels of compensation, 
status, subsidized personal loans or perk consumption. Because of these private benefits of 
control, management’s interests diverge from the interests of other shareholders. In the model, 
IPO investors anticipate the conflict of interests with management and reduce the price they are 
willing to pay for the IPO shares. The reduction in share price will reflect the expected amount 
of the private control benefits to managers. To the degree that managers own equity in the firm, 
they would bear this cost directly in the value of their shares. However, provided managers own 
less than 100 percent of the pre-IPO stock, they do not bear the full cost of takeover defenses. As 
long as managers gain more through private control benefits than they lose through their pre-IPO 
stock ownership, they decide to adopt takeover defenses to shield these private benefits. Non-
management pre-IPO owners also bear the costs of takeover defenses through their stock 
ownership, but do not obtain compensating private benefits. Hence non-management pre-IPO 
owners stand to lose from the use of takeover defenses.  
Several empirical studies have examined the use of takeover defenses by U.S. IPO firms. 
Field and Karpoff (2002) report that IPO managers are most likely to deploy takeover defenses 
when they earn high levels of cash compensation, bear little cost in terms of lost share value, and 
can act independently from non-management shareholders. Based on these findings, Field and 
Karpoff (2002) conclude that IPO managers are likely to use takeover defenses when they have 
large private benefits of control and they can shift some of the costs onto non-management pre-
IPO investors. They also report that IPO firms with takeover defenses are less likely to be 
acquired in the next five years compared to other IPO firms, but that the presence of takeover 
defenses is unrelated to the takeover premium being paid. This suggests that managers do not use 
takeover defenses to negotiate higher takeover premiums that would benefit all shareholders. 
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 Daines and Klausner (2001) study the determinants of takeover defenses for a sample of 
U.S. IPO firms. They show that the use of takeover defenses cannot be explained by efficiency 
theories. The first efficiency explanation relates to the increased bargaining power to negotiate 
higher takeover premiums. Stulz (1988) argues that takeover defenses reduce the probability of a 
successful takeover, but increase the premium if a takeover bid is made. As long as the 
probability of a takeover is not reduced to zero and the shareholders receive a sufficiently higher 
premium if a successful takeover does occur, all shareholders would benefit from takeover 
defenses. Daines and Klausner (2001) find that U.S. IPO firms adopt more protective takeover 
defenses when the market for corporate control in an IPO firm’s industry is more competitive. 
This finding is at odds with the bargaining power hypothesis. Incumbent management’s 
bargaining power is already strong when several bidders compete for control. In such 
circumstances there should be a decreased, instead of an increased, need for management to 
adopt takeover defenses to strengthen its bargaining power.  
The second efficiency explanation involves the reduction of managerial myopia. Stein 
(1988) argues that if shareholders are imperfectly informed, temporarily low earnings may cause 
the stock to become undervalued, increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unattractive price. 
So as to prevent these unwanted bids, myopic managers may decide to increase current profits at 
the expense of long-term interests (e.g., research and development expenditures). In order to 
resolve this managerial myopia the firm may adopt takeover defenses to give incumbent 
management greater power to block value-reducing takeover bids. Daines and Klausner (2001) 
find a negative relation between the adoption of takeover defenses at the time of the IPO and 
industry-average research and development expenditures. This implies that takeover protection is 
most common when managerial myopia is expected to be less of a problem. Daines and Klausner 
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(2001) conclude that the use of takeover defenses at the IPO is explained not by efficiency 
theories but by managerial entrenchment.  
Coates (2000) argues that the variation in takeover defenses is partially explained by the 
quality of legal services provided to pre-IPO owners. He shows that U.S. IPO firms advised by 
larger law firms with more takeover experience adopt more defenses. However, he finds that 
dual class structures are distinct from other takeover defenses and their use is motivated by large 
private benefits of control. Coates (2000) concludes that these findings suggest that, except for 
dual class shares, takeover defenses are generally optimal at the IPO stage, but not all firms 
receive that advice from their lawyers.   
Other studies primarily focus on the use of dual class shares. Under a dual class 
capitalization two classes of stock exist, one with voting rights superior to the other. Smart and 
Zutter (2000) compare dual class U.S. IPOs to single class U.S. IPOs. They find that dual class 
IPOs sell for lower price-to-sales ratios than single class IPOs. Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) 
analyze the use of dual class shares by Canadian IPO firms. They conclude that, in most cases, 
dual class equity is used to prevent hostile takeover as opposed to preventing a sale of control 
per se. Taylor and Whittred (1998) find that Australian IPO firms with dual class shares have 
higher growth options requiring founder’s human capital to exploit. They conjecture that 
investors rationally seek to shield managers from the market for corporate control to encourage 
managers to invest in firm-specific human capital. Holmén and Högfeldt (2001) investigate 
Swedish IPOs. Swedish IPO firms frequently issue low-voting B-shares to the public, whereas 
insiders own A-shares with superior voting rights. Their results show that managerial 
entrenchment comes at a price since investors value non-founder controlled IPO firms at 
significantly lower market-to-book ratios.  
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Taken together, the existing literature suggests that IPO firm’s management use takeover 
defenses to shield large private benefits of control. In general, takeover defenses do not benefit 
IPO investors or non-management pre-IPO shareholders, but are used to entrench managers. 
However, few studies have investigated the direct impact of takeover defenses on IPO firm 
value. This study aims to fill this gap using data for 111 IPOs on Euronext Amsterdam. The next 
section provides a detailed overview of takeover defenses in the Netherlands.  
 
 
3. Takeover defenses in the Netherlands 
 
3.1. Priority shares 
 
Priority shares permanently vest special control rights in foundations friendly to incumbent 
management. In general, the holders of the firm’s priority shares have the exclusive right to 
appoint or discharge members of the management board as well as supervisory directors. 
Moreover, the payments of dividends and important investments have to be approved by priority 
shareholders. If Dutch company law requires a company to install the structured regime (see 
hereafter), this company is no longer able to grant the holders of priority shares the right make 
binding nominations for board positions.  Therefore, priority shares and the structured regime 
can be seen as substitutes. An important difference between priority shares and the structured 
regime is that a decision of the holders of priority shares can be overruled by a supermajority of 
two-third of the votes cast at the shareholders’ meeting (with at least half of the outstanding 
shares being represented). Priority shares are not traded on the stock exchange.  
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 3.2. Share certificates 
 
Companies may create share certificates by depositing the original voting shares with a trustee. 
For every deposited share the trustee issues a certificate of a common share which is traded on 
Euronext Amsterdam. The certificate entitles its holder to receive dividends only.  The voting 
right attached to the original share remains with the trustee office. Only private investors may 
exchange these certificates for voting shares up to a maximum percentage of one percent of 
outstanding equity capital. In general the administration of the trustee office consists of board 
members and a number of outside members. While the chairman and majority of the trustee 
office members must be from the outside, in practice they are often on friendly terms with 
managers. Certificates are comparable to dual class shares that are used in other countries. 
However, certificates limit shareholders’ rights more than dual class shares do. Under a dual 
class capitalization two classes of stock exist, one with voting rights superior to the other. In the 
case of certificates shareholders are simply deprived of their votes, which are not cancelled but 
cast by the trustee office. 
 
3.3. Voting caps 
 
Voting caps limit the number of voting rights that any single shareholder can cast at the 
shareholders’ meeting, regardless of the number of shares he or she actually owns. From the 
viewpoint of incumbent management, the advantage of the voting cap is that the company is 
protected against hostile takeovers. However, voting caps also limit the voting rights of well-
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disposed shareholders. In particular, holders of preference shares and the trustee office cannot be 
exempted from the voting limitations. As a consequence, managers infrequently use voting caps.  
 
3.4. Structured regime 
 
The Netherlands is characterized by a two-tier board structure. Within Dutch firms, as in 
Germany, the management board consists of executive directors and controls day-to-day 
operations while an ‘independent’ supervisory board monitors the management board. The 
chairman of the management board is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). He or she is not 
involved with the supervisory board (no CEO-duality). The supervisory board is composed of at 
least three non-executive directors that are legally obliged to watch over the company as a 
whole, and not primarily or exclusively over the interests of shareholders or any other group of 
stakeholders. This corresponds to the recent proposals of European Parliament. European 
Parliament proposes to widen the fiduciary duty of directors in Europe to include employees as 
well as shareholders.  
The structured regime transfers several decision rights from the shareholders to a self-
perpetuating supervisory board. These rights include the right to appoint and dismiss members of 
the management board, to adopt the annual accounts, and the election of the supervisory board 
itself, called co-optation. The structured regime is legally required for Dutch companies that 
meet the following three conditions over a consecutive three-year period: 1. a book value of 
equity in excess of 25 million guilders, 2. a workers council and 3. at least 100 people employed 
in the Netherlands (Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). One reservation leveled at the structured 
regime is that even large shareholders cannot easily obtain control of the company’s key 
 10
positions since the binding nomination and discharge of directors is the exclusive right of the 
supervisory board. Moerland (2002) argues that the structured regime may turn out to be a 
takeover defense in disguise.  
 
3.5. Authorization to issue preference shares 
 
The authorization to issue preference shares has a limited time horizon. Every five years 
management has to renew the authorization at the general meeting of shareholders. Kabir, 
Cantrijn and Jeunink (1997) show that the procedure of defense with preference shares takes 
place in three consecutive steps that do not necessarily occur simultaneously. First, common 
shareholders authorize incumbent management to create the possibility of issuing preference 
shares. Second, incumbent management grants the option to a friendly party – usually a 
foundation and/or befriended institutional investor – to buy the preference shares. Third, 
management issues preference shares (typically at the threat of a hostile takeover). 
Compared with ordinary shares, that have to be fully paid for, preference shares advance 
a relatively inexpensive way of increasing the number of shares (and thus votes). The amount to 
be paid up on preference shares is just 25 percent of nominal value. The acquirers of preference 
shares can even arrange for a loan, where the interest on the loan can be paid from the future 
dividends on the preference shares. The company may not provide this loan itself. Because 
preference shares get the same voting rights as ordinary shares, substantial voting power can be 
given to a friendly party at a relatively low cost. To some extent, preference shares are similar to 
poison pills used in the United States. Poison pills also represent the creation of securities 
carrying special rights exercisable by a triggering event, usually a takeover attempt.  
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4. Data and sample description 
 
4.1. Dataset 
 
The original sample consists of all 146 Dutch firms that have had initial public offerings from 
January 1984 through December 1999. Companies from the banking and financial sectors (14 
firms), split-ups (4) and privatization issues (4) are excluded since they display different 
characteristics compared to other IPO firms. Firms that are quoted abroad before they join 
Euronext Amsterdam (4) and companies that transfer from the third tier of the stock market (the 
‘Incourante’ Market) to the Official (Parallel) Market (9) are discarded because their price 
discovery is straightforward. After deleting these cases, our data set contains 111 IPOs on the 
Official Market (60), Official Parallel Market (39) and New Market (12) of Euronext 
Amsterdam3. Market prices are collected from Datastream. Offer prices, financial statement 
numbers and information on takeover defenses are hand-collected from prospectuses. 
The sample is distributed among numerous industry groups. The major industry groups 
involve computer hardware and software (20 firms), business services (16), manufacturing (15), 
wholesale trade (11) and electronic equipment and components (10). Figure 1 reveals that 
clustering exists in time periods corresponding to hot issue periods in 1986/87 and 1998/99. 
During these years the number of IPO firms was substantially larger than in other periods and 
investors often heavily oversubscribed the issues.  
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[Please insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here] 
 
4.2. Summary statistics 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. Companies of a wide range of sizes go public. The median 
market capitalization, measured as the number of post-IPO shares times the closing market price 
on the first day that the shares start trading on the stock market, amounts to 62 million Euro with 
a minimum of 11.5 million Euro and a maximum of 13,453 million Euro. When taking a closer 
look at the IPO characteristics, we observe that the median initial offering comprises 22 million 
Euro worth of shares. The typical IPO consists of 33.8 percent of newly issued shares. This 
implies that the average Dutch company does not use its IPO to raise large amounts of equity 
capital by selling newly issued shares. Instead the larger part of the proceeds goes to pre-IPO 
owners that cash out by selling (part of) their existing shares. This contrasts sharply with the 
United States. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) report that the average U.S. IPO consists of 80 
percent newly issued shares and is therefore not often used to sell existing shares. Underpricing, 
measured as the offer-to-close return on the first day of trade, averages about 9.5 percent. This 
compares to an average underpricing of 14 percent reported for the United States in the period 
before the Internet bubble (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). 
The median percentage growth in sales during the financial year before the IPO comes to 
24.2 percent. Return on sales is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization divided by sales and equals 12.4 percent at the median. Long-term debt in the 
financial year before the IPO averages 12.3 percent of total assets. The median company age is 
15 years. On balance, managers hold 44.3 percent of pre-IPO shares. Managers are often 
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controlling owners. More precisely, pre-IPO management ownership exceeds 50 percent in 51 
IPO firms (46 percent of the sample). In comparison, De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley 
(2000) report that management ownership averages only 3.8 percent for all Dutch listed firms 
during the period 1992-1996. This confirms that managers at IPO firms internalize a large 
proportion of the costs of takeover defenses through their stock ownership, which is almost 12 
times larger than management ownership in other Dutch corporations. The trade-off between 
private benefits of control and share value is therefore more relevant to managers at IPO firms 
than for managers at other publicly traded firms.  
The market-to-book ratio is calculated as the ratio of first-day market capitalization to 
post-issue book value of equity. In subsequent analyses, we will use the market-to-book ratio as 
our main proxy for IPO firm value. First-day market capitalization is measured as the number of 
post-IPO shares times the closing market price on the first trading day. Post-issue book value of 
equity equals the sum of the primary offering proceeds (i.e., the number of newly issued shares 
times the offer price) and the book value of equity from the last pre-IPO financial statement, or 
when available from a later interim statement as disclosed in the prospectus. The average 
market-to-book ratio has a value of 6.2, whereas the median market-to-book ratio is equal to 3.6.  
 
4.3. Descriptive statistics on Dutch takeover defenses 
 
In this subsection we compare the IPO firms’ use of takeover defenses with other public firms’ 
use of defense measures. In any given year during 1984-1999, other listed firms are defined as 
Dutch corporations that trade on Euronext Amsterdam for a period of at least five years. Data on 
takeover defenses used by listed firms is hand-collected from the yearly Guide to the Official 
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Price List of the Amsterdam Exchanges. In total, we collect 1,981 firm-year observations over 
the entire 1984-1999 period. To make a time-weighted comparison with the IPO firms, we 
compute a weighted average of the listed firms’ use of each type of takeover defense. The 
weights are the fractions of IPO firms that went public during the years 1984-1999.  
 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that 45.1 percent of IPO firms and 42.3 percent of other public 
firms use priority shares. Share certificates are used by 36.9 percent of listed firms as opposed to 
28.8 percent of IPO firms. The difference is significant at the 10 percent level. A total of 4.5 
percent of IPO firms and 5 percent of listed firms have voting caps in place. Table 2 also shows 
that IPO firms are less likely to qualify for the structured regime. Only 32.4 as opposed to 65.1 
percent of listed firms are subject to this legal measure. This largely reflects the smaller size of 
the IPO firms. The structured regime is only mandatory for ‘large’ Dutch corporations having a 
book value of equity larger than 25 million guilders. The authorization to issue preference shares 
is used by 52.3 percent of IPO firms and 59.5 percent of other public firms. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports on the frequency of the number of takeover defenses. More 
than 90 percent of Dutch firms adopt at least one takeover defense. The use of takeover defenses 
is particularly common in the Netherlands. Field and Karpoff (2002) document that 53 percent of 
the 1,019 firms that went public in the United States during the years 1988-1992 has adopted at 
least one defensive measure. To our knowledge, the rate of adoption of takeover defenses by 
European firms is relatively unexplored. Existing studies have centered on the use of dual class 
equity. Holmén and Högfeldt (2001) analyze 229 Swedish IPO firms from 1979 to 1997. They 
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find that 76 percent of Swedish IPO firms employ dual class shares. Goergen and Renneboog 
(2002) study 54 German IPO firms and 54 size-matched U.K. IPO firms from 1981 to 1988. 
They report that almost 43 percent of German IPO firms adopt a dual class structure, while none 
of the matched U.K. IPO firms in that period use dual class shares. Short and Keasey (1999) 
concur that the adoption of takeover defenses in the U.K. is not widespread.  
On average, IPO firms in the Netherlands use 1.63 takeover defenses and other listed 
firms deploy 2.09 defensive measures. Evaluated at the median, both IPO firms and other public 
firms use two takeover defenses. Dutch companies therefore seem to adopt takeover defenses 
before their IPO and not afterwards. For example, Bosveld and Goedbloed (1996) report that 
only 12 Dutch listed firms adopted priority shares or share certificates between January 1960 and 
July 1992. This contrasts with the results of Field and Karpoff (2002) for the United States. They 
find that IPO firms use significantly fewer takeover defenses than other listed firms do. In 
particular, U.S. IPOs use 2.04 takeover defenses as opposed to 3.36 takeover defenses used by 
other publicly traded companies. 
In the Netherlands, takeover defenses are generally adopted before the IPO. The finding 
that Dutch IPO firms adopt takeover defenses at the same rate as do other listed firms is 
surprising. Even though managers internalize a larger portion of the costs of takeover defenses 
through their substantial pre-IPO stock ownership, the median IPO firm uses two takeover 
defenses at the time of going public4. However, IPO firms do use less share certificates and are 
less likely to be subject to the structured regime than other listed firms. The lower adoption of 
the structured regime is largely due to the smaller size of IPO firms compared with other 
publicly traded firms. The structured regime is only required for large Dutch corporations. The 
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lower rate of adoption of share certificates suggests that this type of takeover defense is most 
costly to management, at the margin.  
 
 
5. Methodology and variable measurement  
 
5.1. Determinants of IPO firms use of takeover defenses  
 
We estimate Poisson regressions to investigate the determinants of IPO firms’ use of takeover 
defenses. In the Poisson regressions the dependent variable is the number of takeover defenses 
(TDEF). Poisson regression rather than OLS regressions are used since the number of takeover 
defenses is integer count data as opposed to a continuous variable. The model is specified as 
follows: 
+β+β+β+β+β+β+β+β= i7i6i5i4i3i2i10i 89NOVICTMANROSSGLEVTAlnTDEF  
  MANOWN ii10i9i8 VCBFOUND ε+β+β+β                         (1) 
We include several control variables. The natural logarithm of total assets (TA) is 
included to control for potential size effects. Coates (1999) notes that different size effects may 
be at work. The very largest firms are less vulnerable to takeover bids, because of financing 
constraints facing bidders. The smallest firms are unlikely to generate the large synergies 
necessary to make a bid profitable. Additionally, if size were not controlled for, then a correlated 
variable (such as management ownership) may appear significantly related to the use of takeover 
defenses, while this relationship would be spurious. Leverage (LEV), measured as long-term 
debt divided by total assets controls for differences in capital structure. Managers at IPO firms 
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with lower levels of debt are more likely to have discretion over the firm’s cash flows. These 
IPO managers might use takeover defenses to oppose the forced distribution of free cash flows in 
the form of interest payments. Consistent with this argument, Garvey and Hanka (1999) show 
that U.S. firms that are protected by anti-takeover laws are less likely to increase leverage. We 
therefore expect a negative relation between the use of takeover defenses and leverage. Although 
Coates (1999) mentions that previous studies only find weak evidence that operating 
performance determines the use of defensive measures, we include sales growth and return on 
sales in our regression model. To control for the possibility that firms with lower growth 
opportunities are more likely to adopt takeover defenses, the model incorporates the percentage 
growth in sales in the financial year before the IPO (SG). Return on sales (ROS), defined as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by sales, is incorporated to 
control for differences in profitability.  
The regression model also controls for industry effects. Given that each industry group 
covers a relatively small number of IPO firms, we group sample firms into three broader industry 
classifications; manufacturing (36 firms), information and communication technology (32) and 
non-financial services (43). Two industry dummies (MAN and ICT) are taken up to control for 
the industry effects related to manufacturing and technology. Stein (1988) argues that takeover 
defenses may be adopted to promote investment in long-term projects, such as research and 
development. Since technology firms tend to invest in research and development projects, we 
expect to find a positive relation between the ICT dummy and the use of takeover defenses5.  
Although Dutch IPO firms may use all of the takeover defenses, at most two are allowed 
pursuant to a regulatory change in November 1989. The structured regime is not counted as a 
takeover defense in this regard. We therefore include a dummy variable (NOV89) that takes on 
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the value one if the firm went public after November 1989. The percentage of pre-IPO shares in 
the hands of management and their family members (MANOWN) is included to capture possible 
substitution effects. Stulz (1988) shows that an increase in the fraction of voting rights in control 
of managers acts as an economic takeover defense by reducing the probability of a successful 
takeover bid. Majority management ownership may therefore mitigate the need to adopt takeover 
defenses. Alternatively, the higher pre-IPO management ownership, the more management loses 
by adopting defenses that reduce firm value. Both effects work in the same direction: higher 
management ownership is expected to result in less takeover defenses.  
The regression also incorporates a dummy for founder controlled firms (FOUND). The 
48 founder-controlled IPOs in our sample may differ from non-founder controlled companies. If 
founders have specific human capital skills, they may require more protection from the market 
for corporate control (Taylor and Whittred, 1998). We therefore expect the founder dummy to be 
positively related to the use of takeover defenses.   
Lastly, we include a venture-backing dummy (VCB) that equals one if the IPO firm is 
financed by venture capitalists before it went public. Venture capitalists have expertise in 
structuring companies and taking them public. Venture capitalists tend to employ value-
maximizing governance structures. For example, Baker and Gompers (1999, 2001) show that 
venture capitalists improve the effectiveness of incentive compensation and board monitoring at 
U.S. IPO firms. Venture capitalists are therefore likely to oppose the use of takeover defenses 
that reduce the value of their pre-IPO shares.  
We examine the determinants of the use of individual takeover defenses by binary logit 
analyses. In the five logit regressions the dependent variables are dummies that equal one if the 
 19
firm adopts priority shares, share certificates, voting caps, the structured regime or preference 
shares, respectively. The independent variables are the same as with the Poisson regression. 
 
5.2. Takeover defenses and IPO firm value  
 
We estimate least-squares regressions to examine the relationship between IPO firm value and 
the use of takeover defenses. We use different measures of IPO firm value; market-to-book 
ratios, offer price-to-book ratios and price-to-sales ratios. In line with recent IPO studies 
(Keloharju and Kulp, 1996; Kim and Ritter, 1999; Holmén and Högfeldt, 2001), we use market-
to-book ratios to capture the expected level of managerial performance. As mentioned earlier, we 
calculate the market-to-book ratio as the ratio of market capitalization on the first trading day 
divided by post-issue book value of equity. First-day market capitalization is calculated as the 
number of post-IPO shares times the closing market price on the first trading day. Post-issue 
book value of equity is determined as the sum of the primary offering proceeds (i.e., the number 
of newly issued shares times the offer price) and the book value of equity from the last pre-IPO 
financial statement. Offer price-to-book ratios are determined by dividing the offer value by the 
post-issue book value of equity. Offer value refers to the number of post-IPO shares times the 
offer price. Price-to-sales ratios are defined as the ratio of market capitalization on the first 
trading day divided by the sales figure during the last 12 months prior to the IPO as disclosed in 
the prospectus.  
We also adjust market-to-book ratios for profitability and size. To do so, we took a 
universe of public firms which at any point in time were trading on Euronext Amsterdam from 
January 1984 through December 1999 and who did not have an IPO in the previous five years. 
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We gathered data for each listed firm’s profitability (return on assets) and size (total assets), for 
each year during the period 1983-1998. Subsequently, we sort all public firms of a particular 
year in their appropriate quintiles based on their profitability or size, respectively. We then 
average the market-to-book ratio for these quintiles in every year. Next, each IPO firm is 
matched with its appropriate quintile on the basis of profitability or size6.  As a final step, the 
average market-to-book ratio of the matched quintile is subtracted from the market-to-book ratio 
of the particular IPO firm.  
We regress the proxy of IPO firm value (VALUE) on an intercept term, seven control 
variables and the number of takeover defenses (TDEF). The model reads as: 
+β+β+β+β+β+β+β= i6i5i4i3i2i10i ICTMANROSSGLEVTAlnVALUE  
ii8i7 TDEFMANOWN ε+β+β  (2) 
The natural logarithm of total assets (TA) is included to control for the possibility that 
firm value is a function of company size. Leverage (LEV), measured as long-term debt divided 
by total assets controls for differences in capital structure. Jensen (1986) argues that debt reduces 
managers’ discretion over free cash flows. Long-term debt commits managers to distribute free 
cash flow instead of diverting it to investments harmful to firm value. Leverage is therefore 
expected to increase firm value by reducing the free cash flow available to managers. To control 
for the possibility that firms with higher growth opportunities are valued more highly by 
investors, the model makes use of the percentage growth in sales in the financial year before the 
IPO (SG). Return on sales (ROS) is incorporated to control for differences in profitability. The 
regression model also controls for industry effects. Two industry dummies (MAN and ICT) are 
taken up to control for the industry effects related to manufacturing and technology. The 
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percentage of pre-IPO shares in the hands of management and their family members 
(MANOWN) is included to control for possible incentive effects. Prior studies have reported a 
positive association between management ownership and IPO firm value (e.g., Keloharju and 
Kulp, 1996). Since managers bear the wealth consequences of their own decisions through their 
stock ownership, their incentives become better aligned with those of other shareholders. This 
mitigates the agency problem and increases firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
We expect that the number of takeover defenses (TDEF) is inversely related to IPO firm 
value. IPO investors are assumed to anticipate the conflict of interests with management and 
reduce IPO firm value if takeover defenses are adopted. Apart from the impact of the number of 
takeover defenses on IPO firm value, we analyze the individual effects of priority shares 
(PRIOR), share certificates (CERT), voting caps (VCAP), the structured regime (STRUC) and 
the authorization to issue protective preference shares (PREF), each represented by its own 
dummy variable. Although we anticipate each of the takeover defenses to negatively impact IPO 
firm value, we predict that the valuation impact of share certificates is especially negative. Using 
Italian data, Zingales (1994) reports that non-voting shares trade at a substantial discount 
compared to voting shares of that same company. This finding suggests that the right to vote can 
be a valuable tool for shareholders to exercise influence over management’s actions. Since share 
certificates deprive shareholders of these votes, the valuation impact of share certificates is 
predicted to be strongly negative.  
Additionally, we expect that the valuation impact of the authorization to issue preference 
shares is less negative than for the other takeover defenses. The authorization to issue preference 
shares itself does not entrench management on a permanent basis. While priority shares, share 
certificates, voting caps and the structured regime are permanent takeover defenses, the 
 22
authorization to issue preference shares is typically a temporary measure that has to be renewed 
at the shareholders’ meeting every five years. Moreover, the authorization to issue preference 
shares is only the first of three steps in the procedure of defense, described in Section 3.5. 
Arguably, the entrenchment effects will only emerge at later steps in the defense process. Kabir, 
Cantrijn and Jeunink (1997) analyze the procedure of defense using preference shares. 
Analyzing Dutch data, they report that the authorization of preference shares is associated with a 
positive and significant stock price effect of 1.2 percent in two days. The second step, granting 
the purchase option to a friendly party – usually a foundation or an institutional investor – has an 
almost negligible stock price impact. The third step, the actual issuance of preference shares, is 
associated with a negative stock price reaction of 1.7 percent in two days. This indicates that 
entrenchment effects only emerge at the final step of the defense process, the actual issuance of 
preference shares. 
Due to skewness of the distribution of the dependent variable and total assets, the natural 
logarithms of these variables are used in the regressions7. In general, no serious collinearity 
problems are posed as the correlation matrix indicates low correlation between the independent 
variables. This suggests that there is sufficient variation among the variables used in the study to 
allow discrete effects to be estimated. In light of the possibility of heteroskedasticity, t-statistics 
using White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported throughout the paper. 
 
 
6. Empirical results 
 
6.1. Determinants of IPO firms use of takeover defenses  
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 Table 3 shows the results of the Poisson regression (column 1) and logit regressions (columns 2-
6). The logit regressions show that pre-IPO management ownership relates negatively to the 
adoption of voting caps and the structured regime8. This corresponds to the findings of Field and 
Karpoff (2002) for U.S. IPOs.  They also document a negative relation between management 
ownership and the adoption of takeover defenses. One explanation is the substitution effect. 
Stulz (1988) shows that management ownership may act as an economic takeover defense, 
reducing the need for other defensive measures. Another interpretation is that, as managers own 
more stock, they internalize a higher proportion of the costs associated with takeover defenses. 
The higher management ownership, the more they lose by adopting takeover defenses that 
reduce firm value. Interestingly, pre-IPO management ownership is positively related to the 
adoption of priority shares. This relation is significant at the 10 percent level. One interpretation 
could be that management ownership reinforces the effectiveness of priority shares. Decisions by 
priority shares grant special control rights to foundations friendly to management. However, a 
decision of the holders of priority shares can be rejected by a supermajority of two-thirds of the 
votes cast at the shareholder’ meeting. When managers own a sizable fraction of the shares they 
can ensure that the decisions made by priority shareholders cannot be overruled by common 
shareholders. Accordingly, managers that own more shares may be more likely to adopt priority 
shares as an effective defensive measure. 
 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
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The number of takeover defenses is negatively related to founder status at the 10 percent 
level of significance. If the founder is a member of the management board, the firm is less likely 
to adopt takeover defenses. However, founder status lacks statistical significance in the logit 
regressions for the individual takeover defenses. These findings are inconsistent with our initial 
expectations. We hypothesized that founders are likely to have firm-specific human capital that 
would require protection from hostile takeovers. One plausible explanation for the inverse 
relationship between the use of takeover defenses and founder status is that founders own a 
larger fraction of their firm’s equity than do managers who did not found the company. The 
correlation matrix shows a correlation coefficient of 0.45 between management stock ownership 
and founder status. On average, managers that founded the firm own 65.2 percent of the pre-IPO 
shares as opposed to 28.5 percent of the shares owned by managers that did not found the 
company (t-value for difference=5.27). Management stock ownership may thus act as a 
substitute for takeover defenses in founder-controlled firms. This result corresponds to the 
findings of Daines and Klausner (2001). They report a negative relation between founder status 
and the number of takeover defenses for U.S. IPOs. Our results are contrary to the findings of 
Taylor and Whittred (1998). They argue that founders in Australian IPO firms are more likely to 
use dual class equity to protect their firm-specific human capital. 
The venture-backing dummy does not relate significantly to the number of takeover 
defenses. This outcome is surprising. Venture capitalists typically own a substantial amount of 
the pre-IPO shares and therefore bear part of the costs associated with takeover defenses. For 
example, in the 48 venture-backed IPOs, the ownership of venture capitalists averages 33.5 
percent of pre-IPO shares. If they bear the cost of takeover defenses, venture capitalists are 
expected to strongly oppose the use of takeover defenses. Coates (2000) offers the following 
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explanation for the contradictory finding. Venture capitalists are repeat players in the IPO 
market. If they oppose the use of takeover defenses, entrepreneurs may interpret this as venture 
capitalists not being sensitive to their interests. These entrepreneurs may then be less likely to 
look to venture capitalists for pre-IPO financing. Because venture capitalists do not want to 
jeopardize their good relations with their entrepreneur clientele, they do not object to the use of 
takeover defenses at the time of the IPO. Correspondingly, Field and Karpoff (2002) and Daines 
and Klausner (2001) do not find any significant association between the adoption of takeover 
defenses and venture-backing in U.S. IPOs.  
When looking at the control variables, we observe that total assets are positively related 
to the structured regime. This is largely due to the legal requirement of the structured regime. 
Only large Dutch corporations qualify for the structured regime. Under the structured regime the 
incumbent supervisory board elects the new supervisory board members itself. Smaller Dutch 
firms, which do not qualify for the structured regime, often choose to adopt priority shares 
instead. Priority shares grant their holders the right to make binding nominations for board 
positions, provided that the structured regime does not obtain. This may explain the negative 
coefficient of total assets in the logit regression for priority shares. Leverage is negatively related 
to the use of takeover defenses, but with the exception of the structured regime, the effect is not 
statistically significant. This is inconsistent with the premise that managers at IPO firms with 
lower debt levels introduce takeover defenses to maintain their discretion over the firm’s free 
cash flows. Sales growth and return on sales are generally insignificant. These findings are 
consistent with previous studies that only find weak evidence that operating performance 
determines the rate of adoption of takeover defenses (Coates, 1999). Only the logit regression for 
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share certificates shows that this type of takeover defense is more likely to be adopted by 
profitable firms (significant at the 10 percent level).  
We find an industry effect related to the information and communication technology 
(ICT) industry. The negative coefficient on the ICT industry dummy indicates that technology 
firms are less likely to adopt takeover defenses. This finding is inconsistent with the managerial 
myopia theory put forth by Stein (1988). Stein (1988) argues that firms should adopt more 
takeover defenses when they have long-term investment projects, such research and 
development. Since technology firms are characterized by these long-term investment projects, 
they should use more defensive measures. Our opposing finding is consistent with the results of 
Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) who report that Canadian IPO firms active in the technology 
sector are less likely to adopt dual class equity. The theoretical work of Israel and Ma (2001) 
offers one possible explanation for the negative relation between the use of defensive measures 
and long-term investments. They argue that the investment in long-term projects acts as a 
takeover defense in itself. Their key insight is that managers interested in maintaining control 
prefer long-term investments because the high uncertainties associated with these investments 
increase expected takeover prices. The increase in takeover prices reduces the acquisition 
likelihood and thereby the need for defensive measures. The number of takeover defenses is 
slightly lower after the regulation of November 1989. The regulatory change limited the number 
of takeover defenses to a maximum of two. Although share certificates were not abolished in 
November 1989, this type of takeover defense is less frequently applied after that time.  
Overall, our analysis identifies few factors that consistently explain the use of takeover 
defenses at the IPO. This is similar to U.S. evidence. For example, Daines and Klausner (2001) 
are unable to explain the adoption of takeover defenses at U.S. IPO firms using efficiency 
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theories. They conclude that takeover defenses are motivated by managerial entrenchment. On 
the other hand, Coates (2000) suggests that IPO firms adopt takeover defenses simply because 
they are copying the use of defensive measures by other listed firms. Our previous finding that 
Dutch IPO firms use takeover defenses to the same extent as do other publicly traded firms 
provides preliminary support for this argument. However, one important missing variable from 
our current analysis concerns management’s private benefits of control. Although private 
benefits of control are difficult to measure empirically, the next section examines whether 
private benefits play a role in explaining the use of defensive measures at the IPO.  
 
6.2. Takeover defenses and IPO firm value 
 
In this subsection we analyze the relation between the use of takeover defenses and IPO firm 
value. We predict that IPO investors reduce IPO firm value when takeover defenses are adopted. 
In theory, this reduction in IPO firm value reflects the expected size of IPO management’s 
private benefits of control. This allows us to infer whether private benefits play a role in the 
decision to adopt takeover defenses at the IPO. 
Panel A of Table 4 compares IPO firm values of firms with a particular takeover defense 
to the IPO firm values of companies without that takeover defense. To confirm that our findings 
are robust with respect to sample distribution, we perform both parametric and non-parametric 
tests on the differences in IPO firm value. Priority shares do not seem to have a negative impact 
on IPO firm value. The non-parametric test even indicates that the 50 IPO firms that adopt 
priority shares have higher market-to-book ratios than the group of 61 firms that do not use 
priority shares. The difference is significant at the 10 percent level.   
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 [Please insert Table 4 and 5 about here] 
 
Consistent with expectations, we observe that the 32 IPO firms that adopt share 
certificates are valued at a substantial discount compared to the 79 firms that do not adopt share 
certificates. The difference is statistically significant at the one-percent level. Prior research 
suggests that votes are an important and valuable tool to influence management (Zingales, 1994, 
1995). Principally, share certificates deprive IPO investors of these valuable voting rights and 
therefore have a strongly negative impact on IPO firm value. Voting caps have no significant 
effect on IPO firm value. The lack of statistical significance may be due to the limited number of 
companies that apply voting caps. The structured regime, on the other hand, lowers IPO firm 
value. The structured regime transfers important decision rights from shareholders to the 
supervisory board. The 36 companies that are subject to the structured regime exhibit lower 
market-to-book ratios than the 75 IPO firms that do not use the structured regime. The 
authorization to issue preference shares has no significant effect on IPO firm value. In contrast to 
the other defensive measures, the authorization to issue preference shares does not entrench 
managers on a permanent basis. Every five years the authorization to issue preference shares has 
to be renewed at the shareholders’ meeting. The actual issuance of preference shares would only 
occur if a takeover bid were made in the future. It is at that time that potential entrenchment 
effects are expected to show up and not at the initial authorization at the IPO.  
Panel B of Table 4 reports on the number of takeover defenses. To check the robustness 
of our results we employ different measures of IPO firm value. We use market-to-book ratios, 
price-to-book ratios and price-to-sales ratios. Moreover, we adjust market-to-book ratios for 
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profitability and size. See Section 5.2 for the definitions of the metrics. We observe that IPO 
firms’ values gradually decline as more takeover defenses are adopted. IPO firms that adopt no 
takeover defenses before going public show the highest valuations, whereas IPO firms that adopt 
3 or 4 defense measures display the lowest share values. In most cases the average IPO firm 
values significantly differ across the number of takeover defenses at the 5 percent level. The 
median chi-squared tests are significant at the one-percent level regardless of the measure of IPO 
firm value. This suggests that the accumulation of defensive measures is detrimental to firm 
value.  
Besides these univariate tests, we also conduct multivariate tests. Panel A of Table 5 
shows the results of the OLS regressions of IPO firm value on the number of takeover defenses. 
In four out of five regressions the number of takeover defenses loads up with a significantly 
negative coefficient. More precisely, the coefficient is significant at the one-percent level when 
using market-to-book ratios as the dependent variable, the 5 percent level in case of the offer 
price-to-book ratio and the 10 percent level when market-to-book ratios are profitability and size 
adjusted. This corroborates the findings of the univariate analysis. The number of takeover 
defenses lowers IPO firm value. The effect is economically significant. Other things equal, the 
adoption of two defensive measures (the sample median) lowers the log of the market-to-book 
ratio by 0.36. When looking at the control variables, we observe that sales growth and return on 
sales are positively related to IPO firm value. Not surprisingly, fast growing and highly 
profitable firms exhibit higher IPO firm values. The OLS regressions also uncover marked 
industry differences. Firms that are active in the information and communication technology 
(ICT) have higher IPO firm values than companies in the non-financial services industry, while 
IPO firms in the manufacturing industry display lower firm values. Leverage is not significantly 
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related to IPO firm value, with the exception of the regression model that uses price-to-sales 
ratio as the dependent variable. This suggests that leverage does not create value by reducing 
management’s discretion over the firm’s free cash flow. Management ownership is not 
significantly related to IPO firm value. In contrast to the findings of Keloharju and Kulp (1996) 
for Finnish IPO firms, this suggests that management ownership does not yield significant 
incentive effects in the Netherlands.   
Panel B of Table 5 reports on OLS regression of IPO firm value on the different types of 
takeover defenses, each represented by its own dummy variable. Only share certificates show a 
strongly negative relation with IPO firm value, which is significant at the one-percent level. The 
adoption of share certificates lowers the log of the market-to-book ratio by 0.53. Priority shares 
are negatively related to market-to-book ratios. In contrast to the univariate results, there is no 
significant relation between IPO firm value and the structured regime, when controlling for size 
effects. There is even a positive, albeit insignificant, relation between the structured regime and 
the market-to-book ratios that are profit or size-adjusted. The lack of significance between 
preference shares may again be attributed to the fact that the initial authorization to issue 
preference shares is only the first step in the defense process. In general, the control variables are 
of similar sign and magnitude as those reported in Panel A.  
In order to determine the robustness of the results from the OLS regressions, the 
distribution of the market-to-book ratio is truncated at the 5th and 95th percentile and the model is 
re-estimated to obviate any problems with outliers. Similar findings are still borne out in the 
regressions on the truncated sample (not reported). This implies that a few large outliers do not 
drive the regression results. The negative relation between the number of takeover defenses and 
IPO firm value may be driven by the use of share certificates. We therefore re-estimate the 
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regression model from Panel A of Table 5 for the subset of 79 IPO firms that adopt takeover 
defenses other than share certificates (not reported). Again, we find that the number of takeover 
defenses relates negatively to market-to-book ratios. Although share certificates are arguably the 
most protective takeover defense, the buildup of other takeover defenses also allows managers to 
entrench.  
In summary, our results suggest that the number of takeover defenses is negatively 
related to IPO firm value. This is consistent with IPO managers adopting takeover defenses to 
protect private benefits of control. According to principal-agent theory, IPO investors anticipate 
conflict of interests with management and lower firm value. This reduction in firm value due to 
takeover defenses, at least in part, reflects the expected size of private benefits. Our results are 
most concrete for non-management pre-IPO owners. The adoption of takeover defenses reduces 
the value of their shares, but, in contrast to management, they do not obtain compensating 
private benefits of control. Although we find that most types of takeover defenses are negatively 
related to IPO firm value, these effects lack statistical significance. This suggests that it is the 
accumulation of takeover defenses that allows IPO management to become entrenched. One 
notable exception relates to share certificates. Share certificates deprive IPO investors of their 
votes. This finding suggests that share certificates are used especially to shield large private 
benefits of control. This is consistent with the analysis of Zingales (1994, 1995). He argues that 
the value of the right to vote is positively correlated with private benefits, which only an investor 
with voting rights can appropriate to himself in addition to dividends and capital gains. These 
private benefits are likely to be at the expense of other shareholders that do not have voting 
rights. The special role of share certificates is also consistent with the analysis of Coates (2000). 
He shows that dual class equity, which is similar to share certificates to some degree, is used for 
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different purposes than other defensive measures. Coates (2000) argues that managers of U.S. 
IPO firms use these dual class shares to protect large private benefits of control.   
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper studies the use of takeover defenses at the time of the IPO. We find that Dutch IPO 
firms adopt takeover defenses at the same rate as do other Dutch corporations. The median IPO 
firm adopts two takeover defenses. The use of takeover defenses is particularly widespread in the 
Netherlands. More than 90 percent of IPO firms adopt at least one takeover defense before going 
public. The central question of our study involves the relation between the use of takeover 
defenses and IPO firm value.  
First, we examine the determinants of IPO firms’ use of takeover defenses. Overall, our 
analysis shows that few factors can consistently explain the use of takeover defenses at the IPO. 
This is consistent with U.S. evidence. We infer that takeover defenses are motivated by 
managerial entrenchment. Alternatively, IPO firms may adopt takeover defenses simply because 
they are copying the use of defensive measures by other listed firms. Our finding that Dutch IPO 
firms use takeover defenses to the same extent as do other publicly traded firms provides 
preliminary support for this argument.  
Second, we advance the literature on the use of takeover defenses by examining the 
relation between the use of defensive measures and IPO firm value. In theory, IPO investors 
consider takeover defenses a negative factor with respect to IPO firm value. Even though private 
benefits of control are difficult to measure empirically, the reduction in IPO firm value should 
reflect the expected size of management’s private benefits of control. Controlling for differences 
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in size, profitability, sales growth and management ownership, we find that the number of 
takeover defenses is negatively related to various measures of IPO firm value. Our results 
suggest that the negative effect of takeover defenses increases as the IPO firm accumulates 
defense measures. Most types of takeover defenses reduce IPO firm value, but with the 
exception of share certificates their negative effects lack statistical significance. Share 
certificates are therefore distinct from other takeover defenses. Share certificates deprive 
shareholders of voting rights. As these voting rights are an important and valuable tool to 
influence management’s actions, IPO investors negatively adjust IPO firm value when share 
certificates deny them these rights. 
Three parties are affected by the use of takeover defenses at the IPO.  If IPO management 
(also an important, often controlling owner) adopts takeover defenses, they lose through their 
pre-IPO stock ownership, but gain through private control benefits. IPO investors anticipate 
conflict of interests with management because of takeover defenses and reduce the price paid for 
the IPO shares. The non-management pre-IPO owners lose. Their shares are worth less because 
of the takeover defenses and, different from managers, they do not get compensating private 
benefits. Our results are therefore most concrete for these non-management pre-IPO owners.  
On the whole, our study provides evidence that takeover defenses are detrimental to IPO 
firm value. We infer that managers use takeover defenses to entrench themselves at non-
management pre-IPO shareholders’ expense. The widespread use of takeover defenses is thus a 
clear violation of the proposed European takeover directive.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Table shows summary statistics for 111 IPOs on Euronext Amsterdam from January 1984 to 
December 1999. Market capitalization is computed as the number of post-IPO shares times the 
closing market price on the first day of trading. Total assets relate to the financial year before the 
IPO. Proceeds are defined as the number of shares sold in the IPO times the offer price. Primary 
offering is the number of newly issued shares divided by the number of shares sold in the IPO. 
Underpricing is defined as the percentage difference between the closing market price on the 
first day of trading and the offer price. Sales growth is the percentage growth in sales during the 
financial year preceding the IPO. Return on sales is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by sales in the financial year before the IPO. 
Leverage is determined as long-term debt divided by total assets of the company in the financial 
year before the IPO. Company age is the number of years the company has been in existence 
prior to its IPO. Management ownership is the percentage of pre-IPO shares owned by executive 
officers, supervisory directors and their immediate family members. To calculate the market-to-
book ratio we divide first-day market capitalization by the post-issue book value of equity. The 
post-issue book value of equity equals the sum of the primary offering proceeds (i.e., number of 
newly issued shares times the offer price) and the book value of equity from the last pre-IPO 
financial statement, or when available from a later interim statement as disclosed in the 
prospectus. All Euro amounts are expressed in constant 1999 prices using the GNP deflator (one 
Euro equals 2.20371 guilders).  
 
 Average Median Standard 
deviation
Maximum Minimu
m
Market capitalization (million Euro) 426.77 61.99 1,507.99 13,453.20 11.54
Total assets (million Euro) 162.61 35.10 368.41 2,205.37 2.29
Proceeds (million Euro) 89.38 21.70 212.47 1,476.563 2.18
Primary offering (%) 33.83 23.40 33.42 100.00 0.00
Underpricing (%) 9.45 2.50 19.77 97.73 -31.24
Sales growth (%) 39.25 24.21 50.81 308.03 -33.96
Return on sales (%) 11.24 12.39 25.25 61.18 -199.77
Leverage (%) 12.26 6.23 16.28 95.20 0.00
Company age (years) 28.08 15.00 32.44 152.00 0.50
Pre-IPO management ownership 
(%) 
44.35 33.05 40.52 100.00 0.00
Market-to-book ratio 6.19 3.63 6.96 41.53 0.57
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Table 2: Takeover defenses in the Netherlands 
 
This Table compares the use of takeover defenses at IPO firms with the use of takeover defenses 
at other listed firms during the sample period 1984-1999. Data on takeover defenses used by 
other listed firms is hand collected from the yearly Guide to the Official Price List of the 
Amsterdam Exchanges. Other listed firms (about 120 in each year) are defined as firms that did 
not go public in the previous five years. This results in 1,981 firm-year observations. Data on the 
takeover defenses used by the 111 IPO firms is hand collected from the prospectuses. Panel A 
reports on the frequency of types of takeover defenses. The rows in Panel A do not add up to 
100% since firms may apply more than one takeover defense in their corporate charter. Panel B 
shows the frequency of the number of takeover defenses. *** significant at the 1% level; ** 
significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Frequency of types of takeover defenses 
 
Type of takeover 
defense 
Priority 
shares 
Certificates Votin
g 
caps 
Structured 
regime 
Preferenc
e 
shares 
IPO firms  45.05% 28.83% 4.51% 32.43% 52.25% 
Other listed firms  42.28% 36.85% 4.95% 65.12% 59.45% 
t-statistic for 
difference 
0.57 1.71* 0.21 7.04*** 1.50 
 
Panel B: Frequency of number of takeover defenses 
 
Number of  
Takeover defenses 
IPO firms Other listed 
firms 
0 8.11% 8.63% 
1 36.04% 17.07% 
2 42.34% 38.01% 
3 11.71% 29.88% 
4 1.80% 6.16% 
5 0.00% 0.25% 
Average 1.63 2.09 
Median 2.00 2.00 
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Table 3: Determinants of takeover defense adoption 
 
Table shows the results of the Poisson regression and binary logit analyses. Founder status is a 
dummy variable that takes on the value one if the founder is still a member of board of 
management. Venture-backing is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the IPO firm 
has been backed by a venture capitalist before going public. November 1989 regulation is a 
dummy variable that has a value of one if the firm went public after November 1989, otherwise 
zero. See Table 1 for definitions of the other independent variables. In parentheses are the z-
statistics using Huber/White robust standard errors. *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant 
at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. The R2 measure refers to a pseudo-R2 for the 
Poisson regression and the McFadden R2 for the binary logit analyses. 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Number of 
takeover 
defenses 
Priority 
shares 
Share 
certificates 
Voting 
caps 
Structured 
regime 
Preference 
shares 
Pre-IPO 
management  
ownership 
-0.08 
(-0.64) 
1.35 
(1.94)* 
-0.96 
(-1.32) 
-3.40 
(-2.71)*** 
-1.79 
(-2.63)*** 
0.48 
(0.70) 
Founder status 
 
-0.17 
(-1.71)* 
-0.70 
(-1.39) 
-0.45 
(-0.60) 
-0.76 
(-0.79) 
-0.61 
(-0.87) 
0.17 
(0.32) 
Venture-backing 
 
0.06 
(0.59) 
-0.22 
(-0.49) 
0.18 
(0.31) 
-0.64 
(-0.40) 
1.10 
(2.22)** 
0.46 
(1.02) 
Control variables       
Total assets 
 
0.04 
(0.95) 
-0.34 
(-1.84)* 
0.25 
(0.90) 
-0.04 
(-0.13) 
0.86 
(2.41)** 
0.06 
(0.33) 
Leverage 
 
-0.20 
(-0.52) 
2.04 
(1.18) 
-1.34 
(-0.57) 
-4.25 
(-0.80) 
-5.96 
(-2.13)** 
-0.20 
(-0.13) 
Sales growth 
 
-0.12 
(-1.15) 
0.51 
(0.86) 
-0.19 
(-0.25) 
0.61 
(0.54) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
-1.53 
(-2.50)** 
Return on sales 
 
-0.10 
(-0.33) 
0.84 
(0.52) 
5.68 
(1.80)* 
-1.67 
(-0.92) 
3.13 
(1.42) 
-1.26 
(-1.34) 
Manufacturing 
industry dummy 
-0.09 
(-0.85) 
-0.60 
(-1.17) 
-0.07 
(-0.11) 
-0.87 
(-0.91) 
0.64 
(0.85) 
-0.33 
(-0.61) 
ICT industry dummy 
 
-0.32 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.06 
(-0.11) 
-37.54 
(-39.34)*** 
-0.76 
(-0.59) 
-0.61 
(-0.85) 
-0.15 
(-0.29) 
November 1989 
Regulation dummy 
-0.17 
(-1.85) 
-0.38 
(-0.89) 
-1.74 
(-2.94)*** 
1.14 
(1.11) 
-0.73 
(-1.20) 
0.47 
(1.09) 
Intercept 
 
0.65 
(2.40)** 
0.95 
(0.74) 
-0.93 
(-0.52) 
-1.48 
(-0.56) 
-3.99 
(-1.95)* 
0.01 
(0.01) 
R2 0.15 0.14 0.34 0.24 0.39 0.08 
LR-value 11.88 21.76** 45.71*** 9.85 54.46*** 11.78 
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Table 4: IPO firm value and takeover defenses 
 
Panel A shows the average market-to-book ratios for IPO firms with and without a particular 
takeover defense. A total of 50 IPO firms use priority shares, 32 firms use share certificates, 5 
use voting caps, 36 are subject to the structured regime and 58 have an authorization to issue 
preference shares. We use both a parametric t-test and a non-parametric z-test to test whether 
IPO firm values of firms with a particular takeover defense are statistically different from the 
IPO firm values of companies that do not deploy that takeover defense. Panel B shows the 
average market-to-book ratios, offer price-to-book ratios, price-to-sales ratios, profit adjusted 
market-to-book ratios and size adjusted market-to-book ratios by the number of takeover 
defenses. A total of 9 IPO firms do not use any takeover defense, 40 adopt one takeover defense, 
47 use two takeover defenses, 13 deploy three defensive measures and 2 use four takeover 
defenses. The F-test tests whether the average IPO firm values significantly differ across the 
number of takeover defenses. The median chi-squared test tests whether median IPO firm values 
differ across the number of takeover defenses. The measures of IPO firm value are defined in 
Section 5.2. *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
Panel A: Market-to-book ratio by the type of takeover defense 
 
Type of takeover 
defense 
With  
Takeover 
Defense 
Without 
takeover 
defense 
t-test for 
difference 
z-test for 
difference 
Priority shares 6.69 5.79 0.68 1.93 
Certificates 2.32 7.77 3.98*** 5.29*** 
Voting caps 5.49 6.23 0.23 0.82 
Structured regime 4.12 7.19 2.21** 4.72*** 
Preference shares 5.43 7.03 1.21 0.07 
 
Panel B: Different measures of IPO firm value by the number of takeover defenses 
 
Number of 
takeover 
defenses 
Market-to-
book ratios 
Offer price-
to-book 
ratios 
Price-to- 
sales ratios 
Market-to- 
book ratios 
profit adjusted 
Market-to- 
book ratios 
size adjusted  
0 10.82 8.13 15.03 9.13 9.21 
1 7.76 7.22 3.75 3.78 5.19 
2 5.38 4.84 6.54 2.75 3.65 
3 1.90 1.82 0.94 0.54 0.70 
4 1.19 1.22 0.29 -0.08 -0.09 
F-test 3.44** 2.87** 1.14 2.84** 2.90** 
Median χ2 13.39*** 13.39*** 16.83*** 17.67*** 15.70*** 
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Table 5: Cross-sectional regressions of IPO firm value on takeover defenses 
 
Table shows the results of estimating equation (2) using different measures of IPO firm value as 
the dependent variable. In parentheses are the t-statistics using White (1980) heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors. The measures of IPO firm value are defined in Section 5.2. *** 
significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Including the number of takeover defenses 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Market-to-
book ratio 
Offer price-
to-book 
ratio 
Price-to-
sales ratio 
Market-to-
book ratio 
profit 
adjusted 
Market-to-
book ratio 
size adjusted 
Takeover defenses -0.18 
(-2.68)*** 
-0.14 
(-2.06)** 
-0.14 
(-1.12) 
-0.99 
(-1.69)* 
-0.96 
(-1.68) 
Control variables      
Total assets -0.09 
(-1.76)* 
-0.09 
(-1.79)* 
-0.16 
(2.17)** 
0.13 
(0.30) 
-0.29 
(-0.68) 
Leverage 0.33 
(0.62) 
0.25 
(0.46) 
2.62 
(3.76)*** 
4.00 
(0.78) 
0.44 
(0.09) 
Sales growth 0.74 
(4.10)*** 
 0.62 
(3.51)*** 
1.20 
(4.52)*** 
4.91 
(2.67)*** 
5.89 
(3.39)*** 
Return on sales 0.93 
(2.90)*** 
0.97 
(2.92)*** 
1.36 
(3.45)*** 
6.98 
(1.68)* 
8.14 
(2.07)** 
Manufacturing 
industry dummy 
-0.49 
(-3.08)*** 
-0.52 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.59 
(-2.70)*** 
-1.86 
(-1.55) 
-2.23 
(-1.89)* 
ICT industry dummy 0.31 
(2.03)** 
0.28 
(1.84)* 
1.07 
(4.25)*** 
1.44 
(0.86) 
0.70 
(0.45) 
Pre-IPO management 
ownership 
0.27 
(1.48) 
0.28 
(1.58) 
-0.23 
(-0.78) 
0.85 
(0.74) 
0.75 
(0.64) 
Intercept 1.60 
(4.38)*** 
1.53 
(4.47)*** 
0.42 
(0.76) 
0.95 
(0.33) 
4.01 
(1.49) 
R2 adjusted 0.55 0.52 0.60 0.20 0.31 
F-test 17.95*** 16.10*** 21.41*** 4.33*** 7.09*** 
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Panel B: Including dummy variables for each type of takeover defense 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Market-to-
book ratio 
Offer price-
to-book 
ratio 
Price-to-
sales ratio 
Market-to-
book ratio 
profit 
adjusted 
Market-to-
book ratio 
size adjusted 
Priority shares -0.23 
(-2.10)** 
-0.19 
(-1.69)* 
0.16 
(0.85) 
-1.65 
(-1.19) 
-1.85 
(-1.41) 
Share certificates -0.53 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.46 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.53 
(-2.69)*** 
-2.60 
(1.77)* 
-3.08 
(-2.16)** 
Voting caps 0.03 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
0.38 
(0.53) 
0.54 
(0.38) 
1.15 
(0.94) 
Structured regime -0.04 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.27 
(-1.16) 
1.63 
(1.04) 
1.87 
(1.26) 
Preference shares 0.02 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.33) 
-0.09 
(-0.45) 
-1.54 
(-1.23) 
-1.17 
(-0.99) 
Control variables      
Total assets -0.11 
(-2.08)** 
-0.10 
(-2.08)** 
-0.13 
(-1.74)* 
-0.12 
(-0.31) 
-0.58 
(-1.63) 
Leverage 0.50 
(0.92) 
0.40 
(0.69) 
2.54 
(4.00)*** 
6.43 
(1.07) 
3.22 
(0.57) 
Sales growth 0.78 
(4.51)*** 
0.66 
(3.78)*** 
1.14 
(4.61)*** 
4.78 
(2.57)*** 
5.84 
(3.30)*** 
Return on sales 1.05 
(3.44)*** 
1.08 
(3.30)*** 
1.36 
(3.38)*** 
7.65 
(1.82)* 
9.03 
(2.29)** 
Manufacturing 
industry dummy 
-0.46 
(-2.92)*** 
-0.50 
(-3.13)*** 
-0.49 
(-2.38)** 
-2.07 
(-1.58) 
-2.38 
(-1.87)* 
ICT industry dummy 0.23 
(1.47) 
0.20 
(1.30) 
0.97 
(3.87)*** 
1.21 
(0.67) 
0.36 
(0.22) 
Pre-IPO management 
ownership 
0.30 
(1.55) 
0.29 
(1.60) 
-0.37 
(-1.25) 
1.92 
(1.38) 
1.92 
(1.29) 
Intercept 1.57 
(4.63)*** 
1.50 
(4.65)*** 
0.34 
(0.68) 
1.56 
(0.55) 
4.59 
(1.72)* 
R2 adjusted 0.58 0.55 0.62 0.20 0.32 
F-test 13.72*** 12.05*** 15.76*** 3.22*** 5.37*** 
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Figure 1: Time distribution of IPOs in the Netherlands 
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Footnotes 
                                                          
1 See 13th Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids, European 
Community, COM (95) 655 – 1995/0341 (COD). 
 
2 This prompts the question why these non-management pre-IPO owners, such as venture 
capitalists, tolerate the use of takeover defenses if their shares are worth less. One reason may be 
that venture capitalists do not want to jeopardize their good relations with management by 
opposing the adoption of takeover defenses (Coates, 2000). In addition, venture capitalists need 
the cooperation of management in order to bring the firm public. Managers may simply withhold 
their cooperation if venture capitalists or other non-management pre-IPO owners do not agree to 
the adoption of takeover defenses. In a survey, it is reported that 70% of European venture 
capitalists at some time experienced difficulties in exiting their investments (“Better Exits”, 
Price Waterhouse Corporate Finance, commissioned survey by the Exits Committee of the 
European Venture Capital Association). One important reason for these difficulties is 
uncooperative management.  
 
3 In 1982 a second tier of Euronext Amsterdam (the ‘Official Parallel Market’) was created in the 
Netherlands. This was an intermediary tier of Euronext Amsterdam, for which listing 
requirements were less stringent than for the first tier (the ‘Official Market’). The second tier 
made its exit in 1994 and was later replaced by a new intermediary tier (the ‘New Market’) in 
1997. 
4 Managers may decide to adopt takeover defenses before the IPO because at that time they do 
not need the formal approval of the outside investors that buy their shares in the IPO. 
Alternatively, managers may adopt takeover defenses at the IPO because they anticipate a future 
reduction in their controlling position. Analyzing the use of dual class shares by Swedish IPO 
firms, Holmén and Högfeldt (2001) find support for this argument. Most Swedish IPO firms 
issue low-voting B-shares to the public, whereas insiders retain high-voting A-shares. Holmén 
and Högfeldt (2001) conclude that it may be rational for controlling owners to initially ‘over-
invest’ in high-voting A-shares anticipating future dilution of the controlling position through 
stock financed acquisitions and rights issues of low-voting B-shares. This argument may be 
extended to takeover defenses. Managers seeking to protect their private benefits are willing to 
internalize a large fraction of the costs associated with takeover defenses at the IPO, in 
anticipation of future dilution of their controlling position. 
 
5 U.S. studies use research and development expenditures to proxy for long-term investment 
projects. However, Dutch firms generally do not disclose such information. 
 
6 Given that we measure the accounting data for IPO firms in the financial year before their IPO, 
we match them with their listed counterparts using data from that same financial year. For 
example, if a firm goes public in June 1999 we gather its return on assets and total assets as 
reported on December 31, 1998. We then match the IPO firm with the average market-to-book 
ratio of the appropriate quintile of publicly traded firms, where quintiles are based on return on 
assets and total assets of those public firms as reported on December 31, 1998.  
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7 The distribution of all variables was tested for normality using the Jarque-Bera (1980) statistic. 
For the market-to-book ratios, offer price-to-book ratios, price-to-sales ratios, and total assets the 
statistic indicated skewed distributions. Subsequently the log form of these variables is used. 
8 However, we should be careful in interpreting these findings. The structured regime is a legal 
measure that managers are required to install if the firm meets certain criteria. In addition, few 
IPO firms apply voting caps. 
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